Philosophers working in what has come to be called “the epistemology of religious disagreement” face the task of providing a useful characterisation of the kind of disagreement that they intend to theorise about. In current debates, the issue is often rather swiftly dealt with along the following lines: a disagreement D qualifies as a religious one if, and only if, the proposition that is under dispute between the parties to D is a religious proposition. The obvious next question as to what it means for a proposition to be of the religious variety is then usually answered by pointing to a few, allegedly uncontentious, paradigms – such as the proposition that God exists. The first section of this paper argues that the account of religious disagreement in terms of religious propositions is problematic in various respects. Many disagreements that deserve the attention of epistemologists of religion concern propositions that are not at all paradigmatically religious. Those propositions regard, for instance, such things as attire, diet, or gender relations, and while any one of them may be relevant to the religious outlook of one or another person or community, none of them is usefully labelled as a religious proposition. The second section outlines and motivates a notion of religious relevance, which, unlike the standard account, allows epistemologists of religion to do justice to the fact that there is no neat line of demarcation between religious and non-religious discourses, and thus no neat distinction between religious and non-religious disagreements. Another advantage of the notion, or so I will argue, consists in its usefulness for talking about disagreements between believers and non-believers without misrecognising the latter as – nolens volens – taking a religious stance.